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ABSTRACT: This article provides a comprehensive synthesis and evaluation of the existing 
literature on multinationals (MNEs) and foreign direct investment (FDI). It covers both 
theoretical and empirical studies. On the theoretical side, it offers a chronological description of 
the main strands since the earliest perfect competition studies from the 1960s till new recent 
contributions such as the Knowledge-capital model or those on internalisation issues. On the 
empirical side, it concentrates on the effects of MNEs and FDI on host economies, given their 
controversy. It reviews their impact on foreign trade, domestic firms’ productivity, market 
structure, wages and GDP growth. It also analyses a nascent and less known literature on 
empirical computable general equilibrium models that include the activities of MNEs. 
Key words: Multinational enterprises, Foreign direct investment, Industry performance, 
Computable general equilibrium models.  
JEL Classification: F21, F23, L10. 
 
RESUMEN: Este artículo ofrece una síntesis y valoración de la literatura sobre empresas 
multinacionales (EMNs) y flujos de inversión extranjera directa (IED), desde una perspectiva 
tanto teórica como empírica. En su parte teórica desgrana las principales corrientes 
cronológicamente; desde los análisis de competencia perfecta de los años sesenta, hasta 
contribuciones más recientes como el “Knowledge-capital model” o modelos sobre 
internalización. En el plano empírico se centra en los controvertidos efectos de las EMNs y la 
IED en los países receptores, analizando su impacto sobre el comercio exterior, la productividad 
de las empresas nacionales, la estructura de mercado, los salarios y el crecimiento del PIB. 
También se analiza una literatura empírica pionera y menos conocida de modelos de equilibrio 
general computable que incluyen EMNs. 
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industria, Modelos de equilibrio general aplicado.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) are nowadays the focus of much attention as they are central 
players in the world economy. However, their scientific analysis constitutes a young discipline. 
Most studies begun in the 1960s, a period in which foreign direct investment (FDI) was 
experiencing an enormous growth, which attracted economists’ attention. This was not, however, 
the first moment in which FDI had grown dramatically. Baldwin and Martin (1999) describe two 
waves of globalisation which are related to a rise in FDI flows, among other aspects. The first 
wave had taken place in the period 1820-1914, and was characterised by North to South FDI in 
primary product sectors and railroads. The second wage initialised in the 1960s and still continues 
nowadays, involving FDI mainly among developed nations with a focus on manufacturing, 
services and outsourcing. What caused such remarkable growth of FDI in the past? What is 
causing it nowadays? Which are its consequences?  
 
The study of MNEs and FDI has been a fertile research topic. A number of authors have 
devoted their efforts to review the literature; see, among others, Agarwal (1980), Graham (1992), 
Markusen (1995), Blomström and Kokko (1997), Lipsey (2002), Barba Navaretti and Venables 
(2004), Feenstra (2004), Caves (2007) and Greenaway and Kneller (2007). This article offers a 
concise but comprehensive review and evaluation of the existing literature since its beginnings till 
new recent contributions. In our approach to the vast array of empirical and theoretical studies 
on MNEs and FDI we have two main targets in mind. First, we offer a chronological description 
of the main theoretical strands. In particular, we show that some of the earlier studies provided 
enlightening ideas, which are now being developed through more formal and sophisticated 
analyses, such as Markusen’s (2002) Knowledge-capital model, or the recent studies on 
internalisation issues.  
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Second, the effects of MNEs have been very much debated, and there is still some controversy 
regarding their impact on host economies, as can be seen in the active antiglobalisation 
movements. Therefore, we take a look to the empirical studies on this matter. We find that this is 
a very fragmented area of the literature, in which there are dispersed contributions and different 
strands according to the particular effect of MNEs analysed. Thus, there is literature on their 
impact on wages, a different literature on their effects on foreign trade, another one on 
productivity, on market structure, and so on. Apart from the idea that MNEs are more 
productive and pay higher wages than domestic firms, the empirical studies seem rather 
inconclusive regarding many of their effects on the host economies. Can we see which economic 
forces prevail among the several simultaneous ones that MNEs unleash in a host economy? 
Facing such a fragmented literature, it seems difficult to obtain an economy-wide evaluation of 
their impact. Therefore, this study also looks at a less known and nascent empirical line of 
research which seems suitable for this type of analyses, namely, computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) models which have recently include the activities of MNEs.  
 
To this aim, this paper is organised as follows. We begin with the theory in the next section. We 
successively review the perfect competition approaches from the 1960s, which treated FDI as a 
mere capital movement (section 2.1); the imperfect competition approaches from the 1970s, in 
which MNEs’ aspects were added to FDI modeling (section 2.2); the imperfect competition 
approaches that appeared from the 1980s onwards, which differentiate between vertical and 
horizontal MNEs, including the knowledge capital model and heterogenous firms (section 2.3); 
and some new contributions on internalisation issues related to FDI (section 2.4). Section 3 goes 
on with the review of empirical studies. In its first part (section 3.1) we present some 
characteristics for which applied studies have found rather robust evidence. Next (section 3.2), 
we show some results on the impact of MNEs on foreign trade (section 3.2.1), domestic firms 
productivity (section 3.2.2), market structure (section 3.2.3), wages (section 3.2.4) and GDP 
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growth (3.2.5). In the last part (section 3.3.), we look at the results offered by computable general 
equilibrium models. Finally, some concluding remarks are presented in section 4.   
 
2. Multinational firms and foreign direct investment: Main theoretical 
strands 
 
 
2.1 Perfect competition approaches (1960s): Foreign direct investment as a capital 
movement  
 
 
The first formalisations of FDI tended to model it as capital (i.e., a production factor) moving 
across countries. This idea was a logical extension of the traditional theory of investment 
responding to differences in the expected rates of return on capital. This view, therefore, 
predicted that FDI would go from capital abundant countries (where its return was low) to 
capital scarce countries (where its return was high). Two early theoretical contributions in this 
line are Mundell (1957) and MacDougall (1960). 
 
Mundell (1957) analysed the effects of factor movements in a two-sector, two countries and two-
factors (2×2×2) Heckscher-Ohlin model. Under this framework, unless factor endowments 
differences between the two countries are extreme, so that the factor price equalisation theorem 
does not hold, product and factor prices remain unchanged after a capital inflow. Another 
outcome stemming from his model is that the capital inflow reduces imports, i.e., trade and 
capital movements are found to be substitutes. This is why his contribution has been summarised 
in the idea that “trade in factors is a substitute for trade in goods”.  
 
The suggestion that capital flows do not have any effect on factor prices, obtained in a 
Heckscher-Ohlin model, is a rather surprising result. In fact, adding the assumption of specific 
factors to a simple (2×2×2) Heckscher-Ohlin model considerably changes the outcomes, as 
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capital inflows do affect factor rewards and gives rise to cross-hauled FDI flows, i.e., there will be 
two-way flows between pairs of countries (Caves, 1971; Jones, 1971; Neary, 1978; Brown et al., 
2003; Caves, 2007). This is a nice characteristic which matches the empirical evidence of most 
developed countries simultaneously sending and receiving FDI inflows. 
  
Rather than analysing factor movements, as in Mundell (1957), MacDougall (1960) focuses on 
the simplest case of a capital inflow into a one-sector economy. FDI inflows in this setting lower 
the capital rent in the receiving economy, but also increase labour productivity. The latter effect 
predominates, increasing welfare for the receiving economy.  
 
Some findings from the models above, such as two-way flows of direct investment, or the 
potential substitution between trade and FDI are genuine intuitions. However, this theory does 
not seem to be convincing as an explanation of FDI. The bulk of FDI flows originates in (and is 
directed to) developed economies, which should be capital abundant (Barba Navaretti and 
Venables, 2004, chapter 1; Markusen, 2002; UNCTAD, several years). In fact, the share of 
developing economies in world gross FDI flows has usually been around 20-25 percent since the 
1970s onwards (Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004, chapter 1). Furthermore, only a small 
number of developing economies receive these FDI inflows in the last years, e.g., China accounts 
for nearly one-quarter of the total, and a few economies in Asia and Latin America account for 
the rest, whereas flows going to Africa are nearly negligible (Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004, 
chapter 1; UNCTAD, several years). This means that capital does not go to high return locations, 
i.e., developing countries with low capital endowments. Nevertheless, data problems may lead to 
defend that this theory still holds because it was tested using inappropriate variables. On the one 
hand, there are many problems to calculate the correct rate of return. Empirical analysis usually 
relies on profits calculated from an accounting point of view which differ from those derived 
from economic criteria. This is so because MNEs use transfer prices for transactions between the 
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parent and subsidiaries to make profits arise in countries with the most favourable tax 
environment, among other reasons. On the other hand, Yeaple (2003) maintains that aggregation 
biases might be behind the empirical outcome that FDI is not related to differences in capital 
endowments (and, consequently, on the rate of return of capital) across countries.     
 
In the 1960s and 1970s some economists worked on the empirical relationship between FDI, the 
rate of return and risk (Agarwal, 1980). The so called portfolio theory predicts a positive relation of 
FDI with respect to the rate of return and a negative one with respect to risk. Portfolio 
diversification may help to reduce the total risk involved, i.e., a firm can reduce risks by 
undertaking projects in more than one country. However, the portfolio theory is an extension of 
a vision of FDI as capital movements. In this sense, it is still incomplete. We see clearly 
nowadays, that the essence of FDI is that it is related to a particular type of firms’ production 
abroad. Each firm has a unique bundle of factors, competencies and procedures which get 
transferred to foreign operations when FDI occurs. Therefore, FDI is best thought of as 
movements of firms, rather than simple movements of capital (Graham, 1992; Lipsey, 2002; 
Markusen, 2002; Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004, chapter 11; Feenstra, 2004). This idea had 
appeared earlier. Indeed, some authors abandoned the emphasis on FDI as capital movements 
and turn their attention to the MNE. We will come back to this shortly. 
 
Before continuing, however, we should comment that many theoretical and empirical models 
have treated FDI as capital flows. An example is Feenstra and Hanson (1996), which offers a 
variant of the Heckscher-Ohlin model in which they introduce skilled and unskilled labour, apart 
from capital, as factors of production. In their setting, MNEs headquartered in developed 
countries (North) send capital to open subsidiaries to developing countries (South). MNEs 
transfer to the South tasks that are less skilled-intensive than those of the North but more skilled-
intensive than those usually carried out by firms in the South. Their model yields an interesting 
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outcome regarding wages. Skilled labour wages will increase in the South and in the North, while 
unskilled wages lose in both areas. Their finding is consistent with their own econometric testing 
on Mexico’s case in the 1980s.  
 
2.2 Imperfect competition approaches (1970s): Adding multinationals  
 
The theories discussed above are based on the assumption of perfect competition in domestic 
factor and/or product markets. They belong to the traditional trade theory that has dominated 
for decades, based on competitive, constant-returns models. Hymer’s (1976) work showed that 
the idea of FDI as a simple capital movement responding to rates of return (with or without risk) 
did not match the real characteristics of MNEs’ activities. His pioneering analysis was in his PhD 
Dissertation, which dates back to 1960, but was published much later, in 1976. The consequences 
of his contribution were and still are very important. He drew attention to the MNE, in 
particular, to the type of assets the MNE owned and to the difficulty of transferring those assets -
due to market imperfections-. Two main types of market imperfections are relevant. One arises from 
MNEs’ advantages with respect to firms with no foreign operations (the differentiation between 
firm types -MNEs versus domestic- violates the assumptions of perfect competition); and the 
other is due to transaction costs. Let us briefly review both in turn.   
 
First, MNEs have some advantages compared to local firms. When establishing plants in a 
foreign country MNEs have some disadvantages compared with local firms (e.g., ignorance of 
customers’ preferences, legal system, institutional framework and the cost of operating away from 
the parent company). If, despite these disadvantages, MNEs decide to establish plants abroad, 
they must possess some advantages to which existing or potential local competitors have no 
access and that more than compensate the disadvantages. Second, the concept of transaction 
costs. Transaction costs arise from the difficulties of using the market to organise transactions 
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(e.g., it is hard to design a contract between the firm and its suppliers that contemplates all the 
circumstances that may arise in the future), therefore the firms’ internal procedures are better 
suited than the market to organise transactions. This point will be further developed later on. 
 
A different approach to FDI should also be mentioned: the product-cycle theory (Vernon, 1966). 
This theory gave useful explanations for the expansion of US MNEs after World War II. It 
explains FDI as a reaction to the threat of losing markets as a product matures, and as a search of 
cheaper factor costs to face competition. Its essence is that most products follow a similar life 
cycle. In a first stage, the product appears as an innovation which is sold locally in the same 
country where it is produced (the US). This is so in order to facilitate satisfying local demand 
while having an efficient coordination between research, development and production units. In a 
second stage, the product begins to be exported (to Western Europe). In a third stage, some 
competitors arise in Europe. If conditions are favourable the firm will establish foreign 
subsidiaries there to face the increased competition and it may also establish subsidiaries in less 
developed countries to have access to cheaper labour costs to enhance its competitiveness. 
 
Vernon (1979) himself recognised that the circumstances had changed rapidly since his theory 
was developed and that this had considerably weakened its predictive power.  However, the 
product-cycle theory provided a framework under which a number of authors dealt with crucial 
questions about FDI. Hirsch (1976), for example, worked on the circumstances which influence a 
firm’s decision on whether using exports or FDI to serve the foreign market. His model takes 
into account the costs of managing production abroad as well as the asset specificity of the 
capital owned by MNEs in a simple but complete framework. Other studies, this time empirically 
oriented, worked on the effects of tariffs on FDI and on the predominance of MNEs in 
industries characterised by differentiated output and more highly educated employees. Thus, we 
find some authors that, while being related to the product cycle theory, were already using 
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modern approaches to FDI, anticipating those of the 1980s. Before moving on to that period, 
though, we have to devote some attention to the important work of Dunning. 
 
The analysis of Hymer (1976) was given an important step forward by Dunning’s work (1977, 
1979, 2000). Dunning put together already existing elements in a coherent and unified 
framework. He provided a triad of conditions necessary for a firm to become a MNE. These 
three conditions constitute the basis of the eclectic or OLI paradigm, where OLI stands for 
“ownership, location and internalisation”. Ownership means the sort of advantages that MNEs 
should have in the same line of what has just been explained when talking about Hymer’s 
contribution. Location gives the idea that for a MNE to establish a new plant in a foreign 
country, this country must have some advantages compared to the home country of the MNE. 
These advantages may be cheaper factors of production, better access to natural resources, a 
bigger market, and so on. Finally, the internalisation idea had also been noted by Hymer, when he 
dealt with transaction costs. It may be more beneficial for a firm to exploit its ownership 
advantages within its subsidiaries than to sell or license them to other independent firms.   
 
The central concepts of the OLI paradigm have also been introduced in a dynamic framework 
known as the Investment Development Path (IDP). This concept relates the inward and outward 
direct investment position of countries with their corresponding stages of development 
(Dunning, 1981; Dunning and Narula, 1996). It suggests that countries tend to go through five 
main stages of development. Each of the stages links the GNP level with the net outward 
investment (NOI) position, i.e., the difference between outward and inward FDI stocks.  
 
2.3 Imperfect competition since the 1980s: Vertical versus horizontal multinationals  
 
We have already alluded to the emergence of the importance of the firm in the framework of the  
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analysis of FDI. This had also been the case in trade theories. Indeed, trade theories had begun to 
incorporate important elements of the industrial organisation literature, such as imperfect 
competition, economies of scale and product differentiation starting at Krugman (1979, 1980) 
and Helpman (1981). Clearly, the new approach was a considerable improvement in trade 
models. What is more, it further provided a framework in which MNEs could integrate better 
into the trade theory. Imperfect competition, economies of scale and differentiated products are 
more in accordance with Hymer’s enlightening ideas regarding the nature of the MNE.  
 
A new literature on MNEs has risen from this perspective integrating modern industrial 
organisation into trade theories. It is an approach that deals primarily with the incentives, or 
determinants, for FDI to arise. Taking a microeconomic perspective, the theory relies on location 
and ownership determinants, according to Dunning’s terminology. Location advantages are 
related to the host country (factor prices, factor endowments, and distance measured as transport 
costs). Ownership advantages are captured from technological aspects of the firm, such as 
economies of scale, R&D efforts and transport costs. In what follows we will highlight some 
remarkable contributions stemming from this line of research.  
 
Within this approach some studies concentrate on the analysis of horizontal MNEs or FDI, 
whereas others do the same on the vertical side of the phenomenon. Vertical MNEs are those 
which geographically separate each stage of the production process according to relative cost 
advantages. They, therefore, look for low-cost inputs and supply their output to other 
subsidiaries of the MNE through intra-firm exports. The link between vertical MNEs and intra-
firm trade should not be overlooked, particularly because intra-firm trade, in turn, accounts for a 
relevant and increasingly growing part of international trade (Hanson et al., 2003). Horizontal 
MNEs are those producing roughly the same product in different locations in order to gain an 
easier access to the host market, i.e. they are mainly interested in sales in the foreign country.    
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Let us begin with the studies on vertical MNEs. They deal primarily with the following question: 
why do firms sometimes break the production process across borders rather than keeping all 
stages in the home country? A pioneering model was that of Helpman (1984). He introduced 
MNEs in an enriched general equilibrium framework of trade including imperfect competition 
and differentiated products. Helpman, thus, introduced vertical MNEs in a model with 
monopolistic competition and differentiated products, that was otherwise a 2×2×2 Heckscher-
Ohlin trade model. He was the first one to formalise the logic of the fragmentation of production 
in such a framework. In his model the incentive for vertical MNEs to arise stems from factor 
price differences across countries. Helpman showed that by splitting production processes with 
different input requirements MNEs can exploit cross-country differences in factor prices by 
shifting activities to the cheapest locations. Helpman’s model proves that in the presence of 
factor price differences across countries, firms have an incentive to geographically separate 
capital-intensive production of intangible assets (headquarters services, for example) from the 
more labour-intensive production of goods.  
 
Therefore, the sort of MNEs described by Helpman, the vertical MNEs, tends to be more 
prevalent when there are differences in relative factor endowments among countries. 
Furthermore, in the case of vertical MNEs, FDI and trade are complements: “the larger the 
difference in relative factor endowments the larger is the volume of trade” (Helpman, 1984, p. 
467). Intuitively, vertical MNEs have to deliver unfinished goods for further processing to 
affiliates and also final goods are traded within the group (parent and affiliates) till they reach 
different markets to be sold. Apart from the finding that FDI and trade are complementary, there 
is an additional effect of FDI. In his model, the introduction of MNEs increases the possibilities 
of FDI leading to the elimination of international factor price differences.  
 
Zhang and Markusen (1999) offer a (2×2×2) model of  vertical  MNEs  in  a  Cournot  oligopoly  
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framework, which differs from the monopolistic competition approach of Helpman (1984) and 
incorporates transport costs that were absent in the latter. Zhang and Markusen’s model predicts 
a positive relationship between the size of the host country and the number of vertical 
multinationals. There is a minimum threshold size below which no FDI takes place. The reason 
for this lies in transport costs and economies of scale. All production that cannot be sold in the 
host country market will have to be shipped back to the parent’s country, which entails paying for 
transport costs. If trade costs and economies of scale are low then the host country size is not so 
important, though. The model also suggests the need for a minimum threshold of skilled labour 
in the host country where fragmentation takes place. Below that minimum FDI is discouraged. 
Finally, MNEs lead to a more skilled labour-intensive production in both countries. This yields 
the prediction of a rise in the real wage of skilled labour in both countries when MNEs arise.   
 
What about the horizontal approach? This is concerned with the question: why do firms decide 
to serve foreign markets through FDI rather than simply exporting? This is not a recent question 
(see, e.g., Hirsch (1976)), and we have nowadays a better idea regarding its answer. A pioneering 
theoretical contribution, though, that includes the analysis of this decision in a general 
equilibrium trade model with imperfect competition is Markusen (1984). In the same line goes 
the work of Brainard (1993, 1997). Her main findings are that firms choose horizontal FDI 
versus exporting when the gains from avoiding trade costs outweigh the costs of maintaining 
capacity in multiple markets. More technically, horizontal MNEs are more likely to arise when: 1) 
firm-level scale economies of scale are high, 2) plant-level scale economies of scale are low, and 
3) trade costs are high. She, further, tested her predictions empirically and obtained robust 
support for them.  
 
Markusen and Venables (1998, 2000), offer two models of MNEs that also support the 
predictions of Brainard’s model. Their novelty lies in their well-grounded outcome regarding two 
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other determinants of the emergence of horizontal MNEs: countries’ size and factor 
endowments. Horizontal FDI flows are increasing in countries similarities in size, as measured by 
GDP, and factor endowments; i.e., the more similar in GDP and factor endowments two 
countries are, the more FDI will take place between them. Note this outcome is just the opposite 
to that offered by models of vertical MNEs. Furthermore, these two models deliver a strong 
prediction regarding the relationship between trade and horizontal MNEs. When countries have 
a similar size and factor endowments, trade tends to go down and MNEs tend to increase. Thus, 
trade and horizontal FDI are substitutes, again the opposite relationship compared to that 
predicted by vertical MNEs models.  
 
Helpman et al. (2004) construct a model of intra-industry firm heterogeneity which is consistent 
with Brainard’s and Markusen and Venables’s main conclusions on horizontal FDI, which is the 
type of MNEs that all these models consider. The chief contribution of the former is that FDI 
sales relative to exports are larger in sectors with more firm heterogeneity. Firms’ heterogeneity is 
a promising future line of research, which brings the model closer to reality, at the cost of the 
difficulty of obtaining appropriate firm-level data.  
 
We have previously referred to Markusen’s work. However, probably, his most important 
contribution is the knowledge-capital model, developed in Markusen (1997; 2002, chapters 7 and 
8). In that model, he uses a two-country, two-factor and two-good model in which both vertical 
and horizontal MNEs are included simultaneously. This means a step forward in MNEs’ 
modeling, which is of particular relevance given the empirical importance of both types of flows 
(see below). Interestingly, the knowledge capital predictions’ are quite close to those in the 
horizontal MNEs’ model. Markusen is, further, one of the few authors, to the best of our 
knowledge, that offers a detailed study regarding the welfare effects of MNEs to which we turn 
now. A deeper analysis of the rich contributions of his book is available in Latorre (2004). 
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He maintains that MNEs may benefit both countries in his model. However, it is the larger one 
that loses if indeed one country loses. This is the country in which MNEs’ headquarters are, so 
he concludes that in contrast to some conventional arguments, it is generally the host economies 
that are ensured of gains and the parent countries that could lose from investment liberalisation. 
Markusen also looks at the effects on a host economy of trade liberalisation, investment 
liberalisation, and simultaneous investment and trade liberalisation. This perspective allows him 
to show that the host economies’ welfare is highest under full liberalisation (investment and trade 
liberalisation). He notes that the knowledge-capital model has a “pro-skilled labour bias”, which 
is an important factor in making results go against the logic of traditional theory. The “pro-skilled 
labour bias” means that the effects of MNEs’ emergence are analogous to a change to a more 
skilled-labour intensive technology in the world in general. In other words, MNEs make both 
countries specialise in more labour-skilled technologies than before MNEs’ arrivals. An 
important consequence can be drawn from the skilled labour bias. If a factor of production loses 
from MNEs’ emergence it will be unskilled labour. This finding is consistent with the results of 
Feenstra and Hanson (1996) and Zhang and Markusen (1999).  
 
Finally, within this framework of location and ownership advantages, a latest approach is a line of 
research which incorporates R&D decisions into theoretical models of the MNE. MNEs are 
generally characterised by a strong effort in R&D activities. However, the intangible nature of 
many of these assets makes it difficult to incorporate them into theoretical (and empirical) 
models. An interesting answer to this is offered by Sanna-Randaccio and Veugelers (2003, 2007). 
Their theoretical model analyses the costs and benefits of undertaking R&D activities in a 
subsidiary of the MNE versus keeping those activities within the headquarters. The empirical 
evidence on this shows that R&D activities are mostly done in the headquarters, however we also 
have evidence that subsidiaries are increasing the scope of this sort of activities (Sanna-Randaccio 
and Veugelers, 2003). The authors obtain two important conclusions. First, the more 
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technologically advanced the host economy is, the more likely it will benefit from the presence of 
foreign subsidiaries performing R&D activities. Second, the potential harmful effects of MNEs 
are likely to diminish if they are not direct competitors in the same market of the local firm. In 
other words, vertical (or inter-industry) relationships between foreign and local firms (i.e., 
backward and forward linkages) are more beneficial than horizontal (or intra-industry) ones.  
 
2.4 Recent contributions on internalisation issues  
 
The theories analysing the issue of internalisation come to cover a gap present in those theories 
more oriented to location and ownership advantages. The latter give an idea of the incentives to 
produce abroad but do not explain why foreign production will occur within firm boundaries 
(i.e., within the MNEs), rather than through arm’s-length subcontracting (i.e., contracts with 
independent firms, a phenomenon known as outsourcing). We showed above how internalisation 
issues were central in the analyses of Hymer and Dunning. However, there is a recent literature 
which has formalised internalisation including it in the framework of more advanced trade 
theories, not available when Hymer and Dunning’s outstanding contributions appeared. We offer 
in the next paragraphs a brief overview of this new literature. 
 
When choosing between arm’s-length subcontracting versus internalising, the MNE, as well as a 
national firm, faces a trade-off. On the one hand, if the firm decides to internalise its foreign 
operations it will have to pay the higher costs involved in setting up and running a wholly owned 
plant in a foreign country; on the other hand, if the firm decides to outsource it will have to face 
some market failures affecting contractual relationships with local firms. Local firms tend to have 
more information about their market than a MNE has. If there were no contractual problems 
firms would decide to outsource activities to local suppliers to profit from their experience. 
However, there are market failures arising from the difficulty of coordinating and controlling the 
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actions of local firms through contracts. In most cases, the firm that outsources has to pay a high 
rent to local firms to ensure that the process “will work”. This results in a reduction of the profits 
accruing to the firm that outsources, incentivating internalisation. There are many possible 
market failures; we will rely on those that appear more often in the literature of MNEs. 
 
One of the possible market failures is the hold-up problem. This problem has two components. 
One is the difficulty of writing contracts covering all possible contingencies in the relationship 
between a firm and its external supplier. The other one is that the local supplier has to do some 
specific investments to produce the components demanded by the firm it serves, or from a 
different angle, that the goods he will produce for its customer are very specific, which makes it 
difficult to sell them to other customers. The local supplier knows that the contract will be 
incomplete and the specificity of its production. He may fear that after having invested to 
produce the input for the firm, this firm may refuse to pay claiming that some contingencies 
uncovered by the contract have occurred. They may then have to renegotiate the contract and so 
long as the investments made by the local supplier are specific to that relationship he will be in a 
weak bargaining position. Under these circumstances, local suppliers are likely to underinvest, 
compared to what they would do if there were no market failures. This inefficiency of suboptimal 
investment reduces the total return to outsourcing.  
 
Ethier (1986) was the first one to analyse the hold-up problem in a context of MNEs’ activities 
within a general equilibrium framework. More recent papers using a general equilibrium 
framework to analyse the hold-up problem include Grossman and Helpman (2003), Antràs 
(2003), and Antràs and Helpman (2004). The inclusion of internalisation issues in a general 
equilibrium framework with MNEs is a very promising line of research still in its infancy. 
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Incomplete contracts also arise from the difficulty of protecting intangible assets. Ethier and 
Markusen (1996) first formalised the case of transferring an intangible asset with superior 
knowledge embodied. Once its knowledge has been transferred to the licensee, this may set up its 
own plant and start competing with the original owner of the knowledge. To avoid this, the firm 
facing the outsourcing versus internalising decision needs to design an optimal licensing contract. 
In this case, the contract should promise important rents to the local supplier to make defection 
unprofitable. But these high rents may be too costly to the firm, again incentivating 
internalisation.  
 
Sometimes, what is at stake is the asset of the firm’s good reputation. The local supplier may not 
be so interested in maintaining or enhancing that reputation. This local supplier may be a 
franchise which prefers to provide a good of lower quality thus saving on cost and making more 
profits. If quality is not observable to consumers before purchase, the local suppliers may free-
ride on the reputation of the firm, make big profits for a period and then break the contract. To 
avoid free-riding the firm may again transfer attractive rents to the franchisees so that they are 
interested in maintaining that contract. This may be a too expensive method of controlling 
quality and the firm will consider internalising. A model along these lines is that of Horstmann 
and Markusen (1987), which is revised and expanded in Markusen (2002, chapter 13). 
 
Other market failures arise from the so called agency costs, which also apply to a wider spectrum 
than the outsourcing versus the internalisation field. However, it arises in this case when there are 
informational asymmetries between the firm and its local supplier. Local suppliers may have 
different objectives than those of the firm, and if their operations are not observable by the firm, 
they may manipulate information on the state of the market to extract a surplus. In these 
circumstances, the firm should design a contract that ensures that the local supplier will say the 
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truth about the state of the market, which may entail a great difficulty. A model dealing with this 
situation is Horstmann and Markusen (1996), which is revised in Markusen (2002, chapter 15). 
 
A firm faces a wider variety of possibilities between the two extremes of outsourcing and 
internalisation that we have so far considered. There is not much research on these intermediate 
varieties, though. A firm may, for instance, engage in different types of joint ventures, where this 
term denotes a situation in which “two or more entities have joint ownership of a firm and none 
is in the position to exert unilateral control of the firm” (Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004, p. 
300). A recent model of joint ventures (Rauch and Trindade, 2003) can allow us to show a final 
market failure. The model analyses the matching of firms, i.e., the difficulty for a firm to find the 
most suitable local supplier to the specific component or activity that the firm needs. The authors 
conclude that when the uncertainty about the right international partner diminishes, joint 
ventures lead to a greater integration of international labour markets than autarky. Furthermore, 
the lower this uncertainty the more the outcome from their model approaches the perfect capital 
mobility framework of the MacDougall’s (1960) one-sector economy. This is again a nascent 
research topic which seems of great interest. 
       
Finally, recall that this internalisation issue is not a peculiarity of MNEs. National firms also face 
the decision of “make (internally in the firms’ own plants) or buy (from external suppliers)”. 
Certainly, internalisation advantages are one of the determinants of the emergence of MNEs, as 
Hymer and Dunning pointed out, but it goes beyond the domain of MNEs. We turn now to 
empirical issues. 
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3. Empirical literature on the effects of multinationals and foreign direct 
investment             
 
 
3.1 Two characteristics of multinationals with a rather strong empirical support 
 
3.1.1 Multinationals are more productive than domestic firms  
 
The comparison with those firms that do not have foreign operations is clear: MNEs are much 
more productive. This outcome is obtained in studies using either total factor productivity 
(Doms and Jensen, 1998; Evenett and Voicu, 2001; Lipsey, 2002) or labour productivity (Doms 
and Jensen, 1998; Djankov and Hoekman, 2000; Conyon et al., 2002; Helpman et al., 2004). This 
makes a lot of sense, because, as already mentioned, MNEs have “a very distinctive bundle of 
capabilities” (Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004, p. 278), the “ownership advantages” on which 
the OLI paradigm is based (Dunning, 1977, 1979, 2000).  
 
An interesting taxonomy has been found. MNEs are larger and more productive than exporting 
firms, which in turn, are also larger and more productive than firms with no foreign operations 
(Helpman et al., 2004; Helpman, 2006; Greenaway and Kneller, 2007).  
 
3.1.2  Multinationals pay higher wages than domestic firms 
 
Many studies support this conclusion (Agarwal, 1980; Aitken et al., 1996; Doms and Jensen, 
1998; Djankov and Hoekman, 2000; Conyon et al., 2002; Brown et al., 2003; Barba Navaretti and 
Venables, 2004, chapter 7; Lipsey, 2002; Lipsey and Sjoholm, 2003, 2004; Huttunen, 2007). This 
result holds for MNEs operating in both developed and developing countries. The reasons for 
this, however, are not clear and there are many possible explanations: 
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1) Because MNEs tend to be more prevalent in sectors which employ a large number of 
nonproduction workers and have high levels of R&D (Molero and Buesa, 1993; Markusen 
1995; Molero, 2000; Bajo-Rubio and López-Pueyo, 2002; Markusen, 2002, chapter 1; Barba 
Navaretti and Venables, 2004, chapter 1; Blonigen 2005). Accordingly, many of their 
employees receive higher wages, pulling average wages up.  
2) MNEs usually are large firms (Molero, 2000; Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004, chapter 1; 
Djankov and Hoekman (2000); Helpman et al., 2004; Helpman, 2006), and large firms, in 
general, tend to pay higher wages (Lipsey, 2002). 
3) As MNEs carry with them a bunch of superior assets, this should raise labour productivity, 
ceteris paribus. Wages remunerating more productive labour experience a tendency to be 
higher, unless the MNE has considerable market power in the labour market. We know that 
market power in the labour market will diminish if MNEs are in urban areas because 
competition from other firms is likely to flatten their perceived labour supply (Brown et al., 
2003). In this latter case, maybe higher wages are due to higher productivity.  
4) MNEs can pay higher wages to avoid their employees to leave and work for other firms, 
thus transferring valuable MNEs’ knowledge to other firms.  
5) It could also be the case that the labour hired by MNEs is more productive per se. MNEs 
may choose the best workers by paying them more than the rest of firms.  
Several studies deal with this latter point. Conyon et al. (2002) use a sample of firms in the United 
Kingdom, which have been acquired by domestic or foreign firms. Their dataset contains firms’ 
performance before and after the change in ownership. This helps them to isolate the effect of 
“foreign ownership”. Interestingly, they find that labour productivity of firms acquired by 
foreigners was lower than the labour productivity of the firms acquired by domestic firms. This 
would suggest that MNEs were not choosing firms with the best employees. Lipsey and Sjoholm 
(2004), after controlling for the quality of labour, find a substantial wage premium in MNEs. 
However, as they estimate the wage premium without fixed effects for individual establishments, 
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there may still be unmeasured characteristics (e.g., capital intensity) of individual firms that are 
associated with both high wages and foreign ownership. Therefore, there may be other factors 
accounting for the differences in wages, apart from skill levels. In another study, which includes 
establishment fixed effects, Lipsey and Sjoholm (2003) still obtain a wage premium for workers 
in foreign firms. Huttunen (2007) has analysed the effects of foreign acquisitions on wages of 
different skill groups using panel data on Finnish establishments, which include plant-specific 
fixed effects and more modern econometric techniques. Her results also indicate the existence of 
a wage premium in foreign firms. This gives evidence for the idea that in Finland higher wages in 
foreign firms are not due to the quality of the workforce, but to foreign ownership itself.     
 
3.2 Some empirical effects of multinationals and foreign direct investment 
 
3.2.1 Multinationals and foreign trade 
 
It is not easy to find out whether MNEs tend to generate trade deficits or surpluses in the host 
economy. On the one hand, FDI inflows may reduce or increase imports received by the host 
country. There is evidence for both cases (Blomström and Kokko, 1997; Goldberg and Klein, 
1999; Blonigen, 2001 and Swenson, 2003). Lipsey and Weiss (1981; 1984) find a positive 
relationship between FDI and imports but fail to consider endogeneity stemming from the 
characteristics of the host market. Bajo-Rubio and Montero-Muñoz (2001), having corrected for 
endogeneity, also find a positive relationship, while Gruber and Mutti (1991) using similar data to 
Lipsey and Weiss (1981) find an insignificant negative relationship between FDI and imports. On 
the other hand, more evidence exists regarding the idea that FDI inflows increase exports of the 
host economy (Blomström and Kokko, 1997; Lipsey, 2002; Greenaway and Kneller, 2007).  
 
The relationship between FDI and  trade  is  related to the predominance of vertical or horizontal  
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MNEs. Recall that for the former trade and FDI are complementary whereas for the latter they 
are substitutes. Indeed, the findings in Blonigen (2001), Head and Ries (2001) and Swenson 
(2004) suggest that FDI increases imports of intermediate inputs from the host economy but 
decreases imports of finished products. Which type of MNEs prevails? Markusen states that: “the 
weight of empirical evidence suggests the dominance of horizontal motives for foreign 
production” (2002, p. 128). He defends this idea for the world, as a whole, because most FDI 
flows are among developed economies, which according to his view tend to be horizontal. 
However, Markusen himself also acknowledges (2002, p. 189) that “vertically integrated firms are 
important in some industries and surely important to some host countries”.  
 
Using data for inward and outward U.S. affiliate sales, Carr et al. (2001) obtain support for 
Markusen’s knowledge capital model which considers the simultaneous presence of vertical and 
horizontal MNEs. However, with respect to their results, Blonigen et al. (2003) argue that there is 
some misspecification in the proxy for skill-labour differences that, when corrected, leads to 
econometric results that support the horizontal MNEs model. This would give less importance to 
the weight of vertical US MNEs. Nonetheless, in their reply, Carr et al. (2003) explain some flaws 
existing in the approach of Blonigen et al. (2003), such as the use of FDI stocks rather than 
MNE’s data, which are the focus of the theory developed by Markusen.  
 
Hanson et al. (2003) have obtained robust evidence for the importance of vertical US MNEs and 
argue that their results are at odds with those derived by Carr et al. (2001). They give a reason 
why they find strong evidence of vertical FDI. This is because they use micro-level data on 
foreign affiliates whereas previous work uses data that aggregates not just across the activities of a 
given affiliate but also across all affiliates. 
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3.2.2 Multinationals and domestic firms’ productivity  
 
One of the most studied effects from FDI is that of spillovers, i.e., positive or negative 
externalities arising from the presence of MNEs. One type of externalities is the arrival of new or 
better products introduced by foreign affiliates from which consumers benefit. This aspect, 
however, has been generally neglected in the empirical industrial organisation literature of MNEs. 
By contrast, some computable general equilibrium models report that FDI inflows raise welfare 
by increasing the number of varieties available for consumers (e.g., Bchir et al., 2001, and 
Rutherford and Tarr, 2008). Other type of externalities is related to the more advanced 
techniques and know-how that MNEs bring with them. This may be transferred to domestic 
firms voluntarily (through the creation of linkages or licensing agreements with domestic firms) 
or involuntarily (through imitation or labour mobility). Many studies on spillovers have focused 
on whether this transference of new technologies from MNEs affects domestic firms’ 
productivity. In this respect, the results are fairly ambiguous.  
 
The studies on Eastern European countries –an area that has received a lot of attention in the last 
few years– seem quite eloquent. Djankov and Hoekman (2000) find a negative effect of the 
presence of MNEs on domestic firms acting within the same sector in the Czech Republic. Also 
for the Czech economy, Damijan et al. (2003) do not detect horizontal spillovers and finds 
negative spillovers for R&D intensive firms, whereas Kinoshita (2001) finds positive spillovers 
for those R&D intensive firms. In the rest of six transition economies which Damijan et al. 
(2003) also study, positive intra-industry effects were obtained only for Romania, but Konings 
(2001) finds negative spillovers for this same country. All these studies use the same methodology 
(panels), firm-level data and analyse a very similar period of time, 1992-1998, approximately.  
 
Some other studies  are also  noteworthy  given  their  particularly  careful econometric approach.  
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Aitken and Harrison (1999) find evidence for negative spillovers on domestic firms’ productivity 
in Venezuela. FDI reduces the output of those firms, which makes them produce in less efficient 
points of their declining average cost curve, thus, reducing their productivity. Haskel et al. (2002) 
obtain evidence of positive horizontal spillovers in the United Kingdom. However, these positive 
spillovers do not seem to be large enough to justify the amount of money spent by the 
government to attract MNEs. Smarzynska (2004) finds positive spillovers through backward 
linkages and no evidence for horizontal or forward linkages in Lithuania. This suggests that 
vertical spillovers may be more likely than horizontal ones. These latter analyses, together with 
the ones covering a wider spectrum of studies (e.g., Görg and Greenaway, 2004; Barba Navaretti 
and Venables, 2004, chapter 7; Crespo and Fontoura, 2007) show a vague, and even negative, 
evidence of MNEs’ effects on domestic firms’ productivity.  
 
3.2.3 Multinationals and market structure  
 
Another important, and nearly under-researched, aspect is the effect of FDI on market structure. 
Theoretical predictions (Ferrett, 2004) are consistent with both a pro-competitive effect (i.e. they 
promote competition and reduce price-cost mark-ups) and a more concentrated structure (i.e. 
they “crowd out” (less efficient) domestic firms with the danger of turning the market into a 
more oligopolistic structure). Markusen and Venables (1998, 2000) and Markusen (1997, 2002) 
show that the type of firms (MNEs versus domestic) which will prevail depends on the relative 
endowments and size of countries, of the level of transport costs, and of firm-level and plant-
level economies of scale. Therefore, in the end, as happens with most effects of FDI, whether 
MNEs crowd out domestic firms or not, is an empirical matter. Empirical studies on this aspect, 
however, are scarce and particularly troubled with methodological problems (Barba Navaretti and 
Venables, 2004, chapter 7).  
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Co (2001) derives a complex interplay between previous levels of concentration, the type of FDI 
undertaken (i.e., greenfield versus non greenfield) and the timing of adjustments in the levels of 
concentration after the entry of MNEs in the US economy. Barrios et al. (2005) and Sembenelli 
and Siotis (2005) find that the pro-competitive effect first dominates but is gradually outweighed 
by positive externalities in Ireland and non R&D intensive sectors in Spanish manufacturing, 
respectively. However, the latter authors find that in R&D intensive sectors positive spillovers 
result in an increase in margins after the entry of MNEs, thus leading to a more concentrated 
market structure.  
 
There is a nascent literature on plants shutdowns which could be seen as related to this issue of 
market structure. However, so far, this literature has focused on the firms and plants 
characteristics associated with the shutdown decision and has not analysed the dynamics of the 
process. A recent outstanding contribution is Bernard and Jensen (2007) who find, with US data, 
that single-plant firms have higher probability of death than multiplant firms and MNEs. 
However, this is due to the fact that the latter type of firms are usually characterised as larger, 
older and more productive than domestic firms. When they control for these characteristics, 
plants belonging to multiplant firms and MNEs are more likely to close than single plant units. 
This line of research may give us some hints to analyse the effects of MNEs on market structure. 
It is not nationality itself which matters, but a comparison of firm and plant characteristics 
between incumbent firms and the MNEs which arrive. 
 
3.2.4 Multinationals and wages  
 
We have seen that MNEs pay higher wages, but this result does not tell us about the effects of 
MNEs on average wages of the whole economy. In particular, MNEs’ wages can be above 
domestic ones as a result of a negative effect caused by MNEs, e.g., the presence of MNEs 
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causes a large fall in average wages, with a disproportionate negative effect on workers of 
domestic firms. There is empirical evidence, rather scarce, but still some evidence, of this type of 
effect. Aitken et al. (1996) find that FDI had a negative and significant effect on the average 
wages of workers employed by domestic firms in Venezuela, while for Mexico FDI had the same 
negative (although non significant) effect. Feenstra and Hanson (1996) show that MNEs 
increased the wage of skilled workers relative to unskilled ones in Mexico in the 1880s. These 
findings are consistent with the theoretical model they build and also with Markusen’s (1997; 
2002, chapters 7 and 8) knowledge-capital model. With a rich dataset Huttunen (2007) also 
obtains results in this line. She derives a clear causality indicating that foreign acquisitions 
themselves lead to higher wages in Finland, and that the increase in wages are higher the more 
educated workers are.  
 
One may also look at the effect of MNEs’ entry on average wages in a country or industry. 
Aitken et al. (1996) find that the wage increase for workers in foreign firms counteracted the 
negative effect for domestic workers in Venezuela, so that average wages increased in that 
country. Feliciano and Lipsey (1999) could not find a significant effect for the average wage in 
manufacturing in Mexico; but, for the rest of sectors, average wages increased. Indeed, Lipsey 
(2002, p. 34) summarises the scarce available evidence on the effect on average wages as positive 
in the sense that MNEs’ entry increased them. All in all, this is still an area in which further 
research should be done, a task which would be facilitated by the availability of better data on 
labour’ skills and their corresponding wages (Markusen, 2002, chapter 1).  
 
3.2.5 Foreign direct investment and economic growth 
 
MNEs often exhibit more advanced techniques and high levels of R&D expenditures, possess 
higher skills and experience, and so on. These characteristics lead to think about the role of 
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MNEs as promoters of technological innovation and progress and, therefore, of economic 
growth. However, given the “intangible” nature of these assets it may be difficult to empirically 
grasp their impact on growth. What are the results of empirical studies? These studies have found 
that FDI increases growth when host economies characteristics point to the existence of an 
“absorptive capacity”. What exactly constitutes that absorptive capacity varies. It may be related 
to a high income level (i.e., rich) countries (Blomström, Lipsey and Zejan, 1994), an open trade 
regime (Balasubramanyam et al., 1996), a highly educated workforce (Borensztein et al., 1998, 
Campos and Kinoshita, 2002) or well-developed financial markets (Alfaro et al., 2004; 2006).  
 
An exception to this positive relationship is the study by Carkovic and Levine (2005). Using a 
panel for 72 economies over the period 1960-1995 they find no evidence that either the level of 
education, income, trade openness or the financial system development are critical for the effect 
of FDI on growth. Nor do FDI flows themselves impact on GDP growth, after controlling for 
endogeneity, country-specific effects and the inclusion of lagged dependent variables in the 
growth regression. However, using the same methodology in an analysis for a group of developed 
and homogeneous economies, Bajo-Rubio et al. (2008) have found a clear positive impact of FDI 
on growth. This latter analysis again shows that due to the presence of absorptive capacity, in this 
case, in the Spanish regions, FDI flows increase growth in them.  
 
3.3 A review of computable general equilibrium models that include multinationals 
 
As mentioned earlier, the empirical literature seems to offer rather fragmented and dispersed 
contributions of the different types of effects of MNEs. This makes it difficult to derive their 
economy-wide impact. A recent generation of computable general equilibrium (CGE) models 
allows combining a set of effects arising from the presence of MNEs in a unified framework to 
obtain their overall impact on factor and commodity markets, trade flows and so on. This 
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approach, thus, offers quantitative results for their impact on aggregate variables, such as GDP 
and welfare, as well as many other sectoral variables.  
 
From a theoretical perspective CGE techniques have been used to undertake analyses that do not 
rely on real data but on a range of simplified values for different variables of the model –the so 
called “numerical CGE models”–. This is the approach in Markusen and Venables (1998, 2000) 
and Markusen (1997; 2002, chapters 5 to 9), mentioned above, and, more recently, in Markusen 
et al. (2005) and Alfaro et al. (2006). This latter methodology uses sophisticated theories 
(synthesised in a generous number of equations) for which computational methods greatly 
facilitate solving the model and establishing interesting taxonomies in solutions for different 
levels of the variables (e.g., the interaction of factor endowments and the size of the host and 
home countries, or different values for trade costs, with the absence or existence of MNEs or of 
different types of MNEs). These models tend to analyse real world problems for which data are 
difficult to obtain by simplifying the dataset assumed. The inclusion of real data in such a rich 
theoretical framework constitutes a challenge for modelers. 
 
The “empirical CGE models”, by contrast, are based on data from real economies, which are 
embedded in a robust theoretical framework, namely, the Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium 
model. For a long time they have not included MNEs, nevertheless, in the last decade, a few of 
them have sought to derive their effects. We review now the scarce contributions in this line. 
Petri’s (1997) paper is, to the best of our knowledge, the first CGE model incorporating FDI. He 
initialises a small number of papers mainly concerned with the effects of FDI liberalisation, 
which is a central element in most trading agreements. The author analyses the APEC (Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation) liberalisation process. Welfare increases in the area where 
liberalisation takes place, but decreases in the rest of the world. This latter region loses FDI 
(which goes to APEC) and experiences a fall in wages. His results suggest that the rest of the 
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world not only foregoes gains by not liberalising FDI but also loses because of failing to keep up 
with liberalising neighbours.  
 
Following the pioneering work of Petri (1997), the FTAP model analyses the impact of 
liberalising FDI barriers in the services sectors (Dee and Hanslow, 2000). Quantitave results for 
the impact on GDP, income, welfare and sectoral output are derived for the world as a whole 
and for nineteen regions. A second version of the model (Verikios and Zhang, 2001) introduces 
more sectoral detail. According to their findings, developed and developing regions gain from 
liberalisation but developing ones gain more.  
 
Bchir et al. (2002) simulate the impact of trade liberalisation between the European Union and its 
periphery in a dynamic model. FDI inflows increase the capital stock and the number of firms 
(and product varieties) in the periphery resulting in a rise in wages of skilled and unskilled 
workers. Again, FDI liberalization leads to an increase in GDP and welfare in that area.   
 
Rutherford and Tarr (2008) analyse the impact for income distribution in Russia, due to its 
accession to the World Trade Organisation, in a model of 55,098 households. While accession is 
beneficial for 99.9 per cent of the households, the entry of MNEs in services sectors is key, 
accounting for 70 per cent of the mean welfare gains to Russia, averaged over all households. 
 
Analysing the impact of FDI through a lessening of the “estimated” levels of those barriers, as 
simulated in all previous models, may introduce biases in the analysis. Latorre et al. (2008) extend 
the GTAP model to quantify the effects of MNEs using a different approach. In a 20-sector 
model for the Czech Republic, they derive the impact of the entry of MNEs in some selected 
manufacturing and services sectors. Profit repatriation by MNEs seems to play a key role since, if 
it were high, the positive effects of MNEs’ entry might be partially or even totally offset.   
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4. Concluding remarks 
 
This article reviews the main theoretical strands on FDI and MNEs, together with the empirical 
evidence available on some of their eventual effects on host economies. First, we look at the 
development of the theory since its beginnings. The earliest analyses, which appeared in the 
1960s tended to model FDI as capital crossing borders in perfect competition settings. The work 
of Hymer drew attention to the idea that FDI flows were better understood as movements of a 
particular type of firm, the MNE, which owned some sort of superior or special assets. The 
introduction of a different type of firm broke the assumption of homogenous producers and 
goods and led to imperfect competition as a framework for the analysis of MNEs. On the other 
hand, the need to transfer superior assets across borders by MNEs introduced transaction costs 
in the analysis, which lies behind the possibility of internalisation versus establishing contracts 
with independent suppliers. The analysis of Hymer was given an important step further by 
Dunning’s OLI paradigm, which clearly stated that, for a firm to become a MNE, ownership, 
location and internalisation advantages are needed.  
 
In the 1980s, ownership and location advantages have been formalised in theoretical models of 
vertical and horizontal MNEs in the context of a complex industrial organisation approach. Many 
earlier intuitions are given a mathematical format. These efforts are nowadays still conducted 
along, at least, two outstanding lines:  
1) Powerful computational methods, which allow theories to incorporate a great deal of 
relationships and specifications. This permits playing with simulations of different levels of 
factor endowments, size, trade costs and even types of MNEs, among others, to establish 
interesting taxonomies in solutions; e.g., Markusen and Venables (1998, 2000) and Alfaro et 
al. (2006). 
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2) Models with heterogeneous firms are bringing mathematical formalisations closer to the fact 
that there are many different types of firms acting within sectors in the economy (e.g. 
Helpman et al., 2004). More recently, the idea of internalisation is also being treated in more 
ambitious mathematical formats (e.g., Antràs and Helpman, 2004), thus reinforcing the 
analysis of an important aspect of the activities of MNEs. 
 
On the empirical side, it seems clear that MNEs are more productive than firms with no foreign 
operations, and pay higher wages than domestic firms. But regarding their effects the evidence is 
less conclusive and sometimes troubled with methodological aspects. There is mixed evidence on 
whether they lead to an increase in imports for the host economies while more support exists to 
the idea that they increase their exports. With respect to spillovers, some may find it 
counterintuitive, but the superior assets that MNEs hold do not generally lead to positive 
externalities for the host economies, e.g., an increase in the productivity of domestic firms, and 
there even exists some evidence on negative spillovers. At the macro level, however, many 
studies confirm a positive impact on GDP growth when host economies exhibit the so called 
“absorptive capacity”. Much work still needs to be undertaken to grasp the effects of MNEs on 
market structure, as research is still scant in this area. Finally, MNEs pay higher wages than 
domestic firms and this generally brings about an increase in average wages. However, there is 
some exceptional evidence showing that MNEs have led to a general decrease in wages which a 
disproportionally bigger effect on domestic wages.  
 
We have also looked at the few CGE models available which have recently introduced MNEs, 
searching for a more comprehensive evaluation of their effects. Their findings support the idea 
that MNEs increase the average wage levels of the host economy, and lead to increases in GDP 
and welfare. Some results, however, have shown that profit repatriation may counteract and, if 
repatriation is high, completely offset, the positive effects of the entry of MNEs. These analyses 
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offer quantitative evaluations of the impact of MNEs on both microeconomic and 
macroeconomic variables in different sectors, countries and regions. Their combination of a rich 
theoretical framework with actual data on real economies, offers a new perspective for the 
empirical analysis of the effects of MNEs.        
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